The essence of this paper is to discuss how Britain jettisoned the idea of supplying military aircrafts to the Nigeria Air Force during the Nigerian Civil War. The paper discusses the air interdiction of Uli Airstrip and official visitation of the British Royal Air Force Officers to Nigeria as major components of the British technical assistance to the Nigerian Air Force. The study adopted historical and analytical approaches. The study employs primary sources mostly archival materials obtained from the British National Archives, Kew London and secondary sources such as books, journal articles and internet source. The author argues that Britain was reluctant to approve the supply of military aircraft of British origin to the Nigerian Air Force. While Federal pleas for British military aircraft was indeed unsuccessful, the UK government made their decision according to a broader set of geopolitical considerations and cost benefit analyses. The British government was tempted to yield to Gowon’s advice to approve the purchase of military aircrafts because of the Soviet Union incursions and French support to Biafra. But, Parliamentary and media pressures solidified the British government verdict to withheld military aircraft for Nigeria. Although, the British decisions may have run counter to the Federal government’s interests, they have to be framed and taken in the context of British interests at that time.  Despite abandoning Nigeria’s applications for military aircrafts Britain consistently supplied other arms and technical assistance to the NAF mainly offering technical advice on the demolition of Uli airstrip in Biafra.