



Turkey's Pro-American Pivot During the Korean War*

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This article examines two significant shifts in Turkish political history following World War II. Firstly, it explores Turkey's pro-American pivot in foreign policy, which intensified after the Democrat Party's election in 1950. The party implemented progressive liberal policies, including democratic reforms, market economy orientation, agricultural transformation, and increased religious freedoms. These changes, coupled with strengthened pro-Americanism, transformed Turkey's image from an authoritarian state to a pro-American democracy, improving its relations with Western powers. The Korean War accelerated this process. Secondly, the article analyzes the consequent rise of anti-communism in Turkey. When the Democrat Party decided to intervene in the Korean War, it faced opposition from the Turkish Peace-lovers Association. The government responded by criminalizing the association's activities and supporting anti-communist organizations. This led to a "purifying campaign" similar to those in other Korean War participating countries, institutionalizing anti-communism as a state ideology. The article argues that during the Korean War period, pro-American progressivism combined with anti-communism became the dominant ideological force in Turkey, shaping its domestic and foreign policies.

주제어 Turkey (Türkiye), Korean War, Turkey-U.S. Relations, Diplomatic History, Political History, NATO.

I. Introduction

The post-World War II era ushered in a new global order, forcing Turkey, which had remained neutral during the conflict, to reassess its foreign policy. As previously discussed, the Soviet Union's explicit threats to Turkey's territorial integrity became the primary catalyst for this shift. Faced with these menacing overtures, Turkey found itself compelled to align more closely with Western powers, particularly the United States. This realignment was driven by Turkey's urgent need for security guarantees, which it sought to obtain through NATO membership.

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In the aftermath of World War II, President İsmet İnönü recognized Turkey's democratic shortcomings compared to Western nations.¹ His parliamentary speech on November 1, 1945, advocated for a multi-party system and proposed elections for 1947.² Although İnönü's government adopted pro-American policies post-war, it was the Democrat Party's election in 1950 that truly aligned pro-Americanism with progressive liberal reforms. This first free election marked a turning point in U.S. perceptions of Turkey, as the country appeared to be transitioning into a genuine democracy.³ The Democrat Party's liberal policies in areas such as democratic governance, economic reform, agricultural modernization, and religious freedoms significantly improved Turkey's image, particularly in the United States. This enhanced reputation played a crucial role in facilitating Turkey's eventual acceptance into NATO.

While implementing pro-American policies, the newly elected Democrat Party faced criticism from communist sympathizers in Turkey. The most vehement criticism came from the Turkish Peace-lover's Association (*Türk Barışseverler Cemiyeti*), an association founded in line with the main principles of Stockholm Appeal.⁴ After spreading handouts to the public criticizing Turkey's participation in the Korean War, the Peace-lovers Association's activities were forcefully stopped and most of its leaders were sentenced to imprisonment. Peace-lovers Association's activities against Turkey's participation in the Korean War and the government's response marked a turning point in Turkey's official stance against communism. After the closure of the Peace-lovers Association, the Democrat Party passed resolutions that aimed at criminalizing

¹ John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2012), 5.

² *T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi (1 Kasım 1945)* (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1945), 7–9.

³ Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), 1263.

⁴ Doğan Duman, "Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye'de Savaş Karşıtı Bir Örgütlenme: Türk Barışseverler Cemiyeti," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 19, no. 39 (2019): 678.

communism and limiting communist ideologies spread in Turkey. To reinforce public opinion against communism, the government supported the activities of the Association for the Struggle with Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*) founded to deter the spread of communism in Turkey. Masuda Hajimu, in his book entitled *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World*, suggested that due to the domestication of the Cold War, various societies across the globe started “purifying” campaigns to solve local disagreements in a forceful way. Masuda Hajimu posited “suppression of counterrevolutionaries in China, the White Terror in Taiwan, the crackdown on “un-Filipino” activities in the Philippines, the Red Purge in Japan, and anti- communist movements in Western societies, such as anti- strike and anti- labor drives in Britain and McCarthyism in the United States” were part of these campaigns to eliminate opposing views in a variety of societies.⁵ This article analyzes Turkey’s purifying campaign during the Korean War period. As the previous studies demonstrated, Kunu-ri and Kumyangjang-ni Battles not only created “the legend of Turk in Korea,” in the words of Gavin D. Brockett, but they also created a sense of unity among those in Turkey. Therefore, any criticism against the Brigade and its mission in Korea was met with stiff resistance. This resistance eventually turned into a purifying campaign, similar to purifying campaigns in other Korean War participating countries, and purposely left dissenting voices outside of the imagined Turkish community. This article suggests that during the Korean War period, pro-American progressivism coupled with anti-communism became a leading ideological perspective in Turkey. Anti-communism was supported by the ruling Democrat Party and it was institutionalized almost as a state ideology. In this respect, Turkey’s experience was typical in comparison to the abovementioned countries that participated in the Korean War.

⁵ Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 7.

II. Communist Organizations and Their Activities in Turkey until World War II

The first communist organizations emerged during World War I in the Ottoman Empire.⁶ During the late Ottoman Empire, a variety of differing ways to save the Empire was discussed among the intellectual elite. The most prominent of all were Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism that were aiming to unify the disintegrating empire.⁷ Ottoman Empire's crushing defeat in World War I prompted an immediate disillusionment with Western ideals among the intellectuals. Therefore, some of the leading intellectuals decided to turn their face towards the supposed Eastern ideal world. The most prominent among them was Abdürreşid İbrahim who found the ideal Eastern compatible with Muslim values in Imperial Japan and promoted an alliance between Pan-Islamists and Pan-Asianists.⁸ For some others, the Eastern ideal world was much closer, in Russia where a different kind of order was taking shape with the emergence of the October Revolution in 1907. Starting from 1919, a variety of communism-oriented organizations such as the Green Army Association [*Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti*], Workers and Peasants Socialist Party of Turkey [*Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası*] were established in Anatolia.⁹ These organizations supported and helped the cause of the Turkish independence movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Their main aim as reflected in an official document sent to the General Secretariat of the Russian Communist Party was "to enhance the credibility of the Turkish Communist organization, to benefit from the insurgent movement, and to ensure that the Turkish Communist Organization primarily conducts its organizational

⁶ George S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1967).

⁷ See: Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (California: University of California Press, 2023); Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995).

⁸ For İbrahim's Eastern ideal see: Selçuk Esenbel, "Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945," in *Japan, Turkey and the World of Islam* (Brill, 2011), 1-27; Muhammed Cihad Kubat, "A Muslim Intellectual in Korea: Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857-1944) and Situating Korea in the Pan-Asian World Order," *Korea Journal* 62, no. 3 (2022): 178-203.

⁹ Regarding early development of communist ideology in Turkey see: Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009).

work in Turkey legally.”¹⁰

While these communist-oriented organizations aimed to benefit from the Turkish independence movement in their ultimate objective of legally establishing a communist party in Turkey, the Turkish independence movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal also planned to use these communist organizations in achieving the ultimate goal of an independent Turkey. The reception of communism as reflected in Turkish parliamentary records was initially quite positive. Besim Atalay, a member of the Turkish parliament suggested: “By walking together with the Bolsheviks we are approaching nearer to Sharia” and some others chanted “to the East” when a notion regarding sending a telegram to thank the Soviet Union for helping the cause of Turkish independence was brought to the parliament.¹¹ Eventually, the Turkish independence movement requested a variety of military equipment, and the Soviet Union supplied most of it.¹² In 1921, the Moscow Treaty (*Türkiye-Rusya Muhadenet Ahitnamesi*) aimed at establishing and developing friendly ties between the Turkish independence movement and the Soviet Union was signed. However, this did not mean that both sides completely trusted each other. From the very start of the relationship, the Turkish side was quite suspicious of the aims of the Russians. These suspicions eventually came to the point of ordering the closure of the Soviet-linked communist party and establishing an official communist party. Following the closure of the Soviet-linked communist party, Çerkes Ethem’s rebellion was erupted and it was specifically linked to the communist movement in Eskişehir and was harshly suppressed.¹³

After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the communist movement was outlawed and went mainly underground. Between 1923 and 1934, rare sources can be found in the

¹⁰ Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Komünist Partisi'nin Kuruluşu, 1919-1925* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2020), 82–83.

¹¹ George S. Harris, *The Communists and the Kadro Movement: Shaping Ideology in Ataturk's Turkey* (Gorgias Press, 2010), 22.

¹² Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2017), 189–95.

¹³ Harris, *The Communists and the Kadro Movement: Shaping Ideology in Ataturk's Turkey*, 34–37.

Presidential Archives of Turkey (formerly Prime Ministerial Archives) regarding the activities of the underground communist movement. These include their publications, how they tried to infiltrate into Turkish Armed Forces, propaganda activities, statements that harshly criticize the ruling Republican People's Party, etc.¹⁴ Communist International gathering in 1934 directly affected the activities of the communist movement in Turkey. According to the directives of the Communist International, a united front against fascism was to be established and it would be mainly led by the youth and the women.¹⁵ After the 1934 directive to form a united front against fascism, the communist movement in Turkey transformed its activities and became purposely much more visible. A youth organization called Turkey Communist Youth Group was established and organized in fourteen big cities in Turkey. Infiltration activities into the Turkish Armed Forces and various educational institutions were also actively pursued.¹⁶

When World War II started and after a period of time, Turkey increasingly began to depict itself as a neutral power, major ideological formations that were previously harshly suppressed by the state began their perspective campaigns to win over the minds and hearts of Turkey's population. Two major players were pan-Turkists that were actively supported by Nazi Germany and communist/ leftists that were supported by the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Since the Turkish government under the leadership of İsmet İnönü wanted to be seen as a neutral power, it did not block the activities of either party, which created a somewhat freer environment in comparison to the earlier period. The communist side took advantage of the changes in the environment and increased its activities, especially in the literary area. Magazines such as Red Voice (*Kızıl Ses*), New Voice (*Yeni Ses*), Communist Day (*Komünist Gün*), etc. propagated leftist agendas to the Turkish public.

¹⁴ For example see: "Prime Ministerial Archive of Turkey (BCA) 030.10.0.0, 08.421.19.," 1932.

¹⁵ Regarding Communist International's 1934 meeting see: Georgi Dimitrov, *Selected Works*, Volume 2 vols. (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1972).

¹⁶ Aclan Sayılğan, *Solun 94 Yılı: 1871-1965* (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968), 219–21.

¹⁷ Regarding Nazi Germany's support of pan-Turkists see: Onur İsci, *Turkey and the Soviet Union During World War II: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations* (London: IB Tauris, 2019), 123–43.

The most prominent leftist publication in this period was *Tan* newspaper. Zekeriya Sertel and Sabiha Sertel were the main opinion writers who focused primarily on Turkey's position during World War II and how it should aim for a more left-centered policy.¹⁸ Sabiha Sertel's harsh ideological arguments with writers from other newspapers took quite a bit of attention. In one of her pieces, Sabiha Sertel defined democracy as a preparation stage for socialism and suggested that "in an era where the world is transitioning towards a better democracy, and even socialism in many countries, being a socialist or a communist is not a crime. However, being a fascist is a crime."¹⁹ In other pieces, criticism against İnönü for being a "one leader" and the Republican People's Party for the destruction of Atatürk's revolutions can be found.²⁰ However, the most prominent criticisms were against fascism and nationalism in Turkey. The nationalists on the other hand labeled *Tan* newspaper as the epicenter of communism and linked it to Moscow which led Zekeriya Sertel to write a series of pieces denying these accusations.²¹ Still, the accusations grew and when Stalin's demands on Turkey surfaced, it created anger, especially among nationalists who redirected their anger toward *Tan* newspaper's publishing house on December 4, 1945. The newspaper's editorial office and printing house were destroyed beyond repair.²² From that day onward, the newspaper ceased its existence and Turkey started to change its neutral stance. As it can be deduced from the abovementioned developments, the leftist movement was under immense pressure in Turkey by late 1945. The negative public reaction was mainly due to the Soviet Union's changing approach towards Turkey. As Cold War era began, Turkey's foreign policy choices increasingly started to be reflected in its internal politics, leaving a very limited space for the leftist

¹⁸ For the couple's tumultuous life see: Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000); Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi* (İstanbul: Belge, 1982).

¹⁹ "Tan Newspaper," June 22, 1945.

²⁰ "Tan Newspaper," August 26, 1945; "Tan Newspaper," September 16, 1945.

²¹ "Tan Newspaper," October 10, 1945.

²² Erdal Yılmaz, "1945 Tan Gazetesi Baskını," in *Atatürk Ansiklopedisi*, accessed December 18, 2023, <https://ataturkansiklopedisi.gov.tr/bilgi/1945-tan-gazetesi-baskini/>.

movement to maneuver.

III. The Birth of Pro-American Progressivism in Turkey

The period after the end of World War II marked a profound change in Turkish foreign policy. As was discussed elsewhere, near the end of World War II, Stalin started to propose a change in the Montreux Convention regarding Turkey's rights in the straits at the Yalta Conference.²³ After the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union started to take a hostile attitude towards its relations with Turkey. From February 1945 onwards, Soviet media started its anti-Turkish propaganda campaign claiming that Kars and Ardahan were originally Armenian. Some Soviet academicians soon followed suit regarding claims on Kars and Ardahan.²⁴ On February 26, 1945, Soviet Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov informed Selim Sarper, Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that the Soviets demanded a revision in the clauses of the Montreux Convention regarding Turkey's rights on the Straits.²⁵ Soviet Union's hostile foreign policy left very little maneuvering room for the Turkish ruling elite. Therefore, Turkey turned its face towards the Western powers since it had no other choice in the face of a Soviet threat.

Münir Erteğün, Turkey's Ambassador to the U.S., died on November 11, 1944, in Washington. However, since it was wartime, the U.S. was unable to send his remains to Turkey. After the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. State Department decided to send Erteğün's remains with the battleship *U.S.S. Missouri*, which was the biggest battleship in the U.S. Navy's inventory at the time. Immediately after the State Department announced this issue, Turkish newspapers started to comment that it should be seen as a sign of American support for Turkey.

²³ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An 'active' Neutrality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 178.

²⁴ Deringil, 179.

²⁵ "Turkish Diplomatic Archive (TDA) 571/ 68095-298075-56," February 26, 1945.

U.S.S. Missouri started its journey from New York on March 23, 1946, along with *U.S.S. Providence* and *U.S.S. Power*, which were mainly supporting *U.S.S. Missouri*, and arrived in Turkey on April 5.²⁶ The arrival of *U.S.S. Missouri* was celebrated somewhat like a festival in Turkey. *Son Posta* newspaper's headline read "Welcome" written in English, and the first page displayed Turkish and American flags side by side.²⁷ *Vakit* newspaper displayed American and Turkish soldiers shaking hands on its first page, and its headline read "Istanbul will Salute Friendly American Nation's Representatives Today."²⁸ Falih Rıfki Atay, editor-in-chief of *Ulus* newspaper commented in his column:

We know what America wants: a world without war or combat, a world that is dependent on the collective trust of free, equal, and sovereign nations, and a world in which only principles, and agreements reign. Anyone who wishes to live in that kind of world sees their fortune starred in the American flag.²⁹

Nadir Nadi, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper's editor in chief also depicted his perceptions by arguing that "America is the most powerful nation on earth. However, this power does not stem from the greed of aggression, invasion, or domination; rather, it stems from a pure ideal of peace, freedom, and equality of nations."³⁰ As can be deduced from Atay and Nadi's commentaries, Turkish news outlets made every effort to depict the U.S. from a positive angle. These efforts quickly bore fruit, and quite a lot of Turkish people started to view the U.S. positively when faced with a hostile Soviet Union. When *U.S.S. Missouri* finally docked at Yenikapı port in Istanbul, thousands of Turkish citizens welcomed its crew. Turkish Postal Organization (PTT) printed a special stamp commemorating the arrival of Missouri. In addition, the Turkish

²⁶ Cüneyt Akalın, "Missouri'nin Ziyaretinin Tarihsel Anlamı," *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, no. 3 (2003): 5.

²⁷ "Welcome!," *Son Posta*, April 5, 1946.

²⁸ "Dost Amerikan Milletinin Temsilcilerini İstanbul Bugün Selamlıyacak," *Vakit*, April 5, 1946.

²⁹ "Missouri," *Ulus*, April 5, 1946.

³⁰ "Missouri İstanbul'da," *Cumhuriyet*, April 5, 1946.

Tobacco Organization (TEKEL) produced a new type of cigarette with *U.S.S. Missouri*'s figure alongside Turkish and American flags at the front of the cigar box. This is an example that shows how much importance Turkey attributed to a small diplomatic gesture such as the voyage of the *U.S.S. Missouri*. The American side was impressed. Regarding the Turkish reception of *U.S.S. Missouri*, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson reported:

It was probably one of the most remarkable demonstrations of the friendliness on the part of a government and people of a foreign country towards US Naval officers and men that has ever occurred in connection with a US Naval visit. This demonstration can be mainly explained by the hope engendered in the Turkish government and people by recent developments in US policy, culminating in the USS Missouri visit, that the US has now established independent policy in the Near and Middle East based on the defense of its interests in the region, these interests being understood as maintenance of peace and security through support of the principles of the UNO. Translated into specific terms applying to Turkey, the foregoing means to Turks that the US has now decided that its interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by the USSR to destroy Turkey's independence and integrity. This is because if the USSR is allowed to destroy Turkish independence and set up a "friendly" regime here, nothing could then prevent the Soviets from ascending to Suez, and once this occurs, another world conflict becomes inevitable.³¹

President İnönü's statement about Missouri leaves very little doubt about the aims of the Turkish side: "It would be much better if ships from the American Navy were close to us."³² Ankara had already started to flirt with Washington. Still, Washington needed more convincing

³¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. The Near East and Africa Volume VII 1946* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 822.

³² Akalın, "Missouri'nin Ziyaretinin Tarihsel Anlamı," 6.

to support Turkey militarily, especially after the Turkish neutrality policy in World War II.



Figure 7. *Son Posta* Newspaper's Frontpage³³

Turkey's pro-American stance after World War II was by no means a free choice. It was primarily triggered by the Soviet Union's hostile foreign policy towards Turkey, which started even before the conclusion of World War II. At the Potsdam Conference's seventh session, Stalin presented his plan for a change in the Straits regime and a revision to Turkey's eastern border to Churchill.³⁴ Soviet Foreign Ministry sent instructions to the Soviet Socialist Republics of Armenia and Georgia to collect necessary historical evidence regarding the cities Kars and Ardahan which Soviet newspapers would later publish as evidence for the Soviet Union's territorial claims. In addition, Soviet special forces arranged provocations on the Turkish border, such as an explosion of a bridge across the Arax River and an air raid against Turkish soldiers.³⁵ These provocations left very little maneuvering room for Turkish policymakers. In the end, Turkey found itself in a position to defend its territorial integrity against the Soviet Union by closely attaching itself to the Western security apparatus.

Since the Soviet Union started an anti-Turkish campaign in its media, a similar anti-

³³ *Son Posta*, April 5, 1946.

³⁴ Jamil Hasanli, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Lexington Books, 2011), 89.

³⁵ Hasanli, 108.

Soviet campaign was also started in Turkish media around the same time.³⁶ The newspapers focused primarily on debunking the Soviet Union's territorial claims on Turkish territory and providing its readers with the Soviet Union's negative aspects. The most popular among them was Ahmet Emin Yalman's articles in various news outlets such as *Vatan* and *Tanin* newspapers. In his articles, Yalman argued that the Soviet Union was the biggest military criminal and that the Soviet Union was repeating the mistakes of Hitler.³⁷ Anti-Soviet propaganda in Turkey came to the point that the Soviet Embassy in Ankara had to report to Moscow that "Turkish newspapers started attacking Moscow radio in an attempt to discredit it in the eyes of Turks."³⁸

While large segments of Turkish society started to feel increasing enmity towards the Soviet Union and communism, American help in this most desperate situation was appreciated. On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman asked Congress for \$400 million to militarily and economically assist Turkey and Greece. Accordingly, Turkey was assigned \$100 million to modernize its army and support its shattering economy.³⁹ Turkish news outlets welcomed this decision and mainly considered it to be one of the signals that the U.S. was on Turkey's side. Regarding the Truman Doctrine, the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper's headline read: "Truman's Historical Speech, President: Turkey's National Unity is a must for Middle East's Order."⁴⁰ Therefore, according to this logic, Turkey was the most suitable partner. Newspapers tried to depict Turkey as indispensable for the U.S. strategic policy in the Middle East. When the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed on July 12, 1947, this event was presented as a victory against the Soviet Union and supported by both the Republican People's

³⁶ Şaban Halis Çalış, "Ontological Concerns, Historical Realities and Conjunctural Developments: Continuity and Change in Turkey's Relations with Russia," *Bilig*, no. 96 (2021): 177–205.

³⁷ *Tanin*, January 6, 1946.

³⁸ Hasanli, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-1953*, 160.

³⁹ Joseph C. Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401, no. 1 (May 1972): 74–84.

⁴⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, March 13, 1947.

Party and the Democrat Party.⁴¹ *Ulus* newspaper covered Turkish National Assembly discussions regarding the Agreement and suggested that “National Assembly Showed Support Friendly America.”⁴²

Another boost for pro-Americanism in Turkey came with Turkey's inclusion into the Marshall Plan. On July 4, 1948, an Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed between Turkey and the U.S. Based on this agreement, the U.S. provided approximately \$1.3 billion between 1948 to 1959.⁴³ The Marshall's Plan aimed to support the development of Turkey's economy by integrating it into the capitalist market economy. Even though there were some disagreements regarding the usage of the Marshall Plan, the Turkish public was still appreciative of American help.

While Turkey under the leadership of İnönü tried to depict itself as a friendly nation and potential ally to the U.S., it was not at all convincing. The reason was simple: Turkey, after the conclusion of World War II, looked much different from the U.S. and its core ideals. First and foremost, Turkey has been ruled by one party from its foundation. It was not a functioning democracy. İnönü was quick to realize that and declared that Turkey would hold elections in 1945.⁴⁴ However, the convincing effect of the open vote and secret counting policy of the 1945 elections is debatable. In addition, Turkey has been following a Soviet-style planned economy for quite a long time instead of a free-market economy that is propagated by the U.S.⁴⁵ Last but not least, Turkey lacked quite a bit of liberal freedoms such as the freedom of religion. For example, in the early 1930's Arabic adhan was banned and the Turkish version replaced it. Under these circumstances, Turkey's inclusion into the Western political or security apparatus

⁴¹ Füsun Türkmen, “Turkish–American Relations: A Challenging Transition,” *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 1 (March 2009): 111.

⁴² *Ulus*, September 2, 1947.

⁴³ Burcu Birinci, “The Marshall Plan in Turkey, a Critical Evaluation of United States' Interests in the Plan and Its Effects on the Republic” (Master's Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2007), 205.

⁴⁴ VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, 1–5.

⁴⁵ Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 209–23.

was nothing but a dream. As was discussed elsewhere, this was repeatedly explained to Turkish officials by their American counterparts in a more formal way.

What changed the whole situation was the Democrat Party's unexpected election victory against İnönü's Republican People's Party on May 14, 1950. The U.S. reaction to this development was that of a surprise. State Department was expecting the continuation of İnönü's reign since, after all, that was what happened in more or less all authoritarian regimes at the time. When the news of the Democrat Party's election victory broke, Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb prepared a memorandum to inform President Truman about the details and the potential ramifications of the election. Webb suggested:

In free and orderly elections held in Turkey on May 14, 1950, the Democrat Party, the leading opposition party, scored a sweeping and generally unexpected victory over the Republican People's Party, the party of Atatürk and İnönü, which has been in power since the Republic was founded in 1923. These elections represent the culmination of democratic development in Turkey, a country which in a remarkably short period, has evolved from an absolute monarchy to a multi-party system, under the guidance of a benevolent dictatorship. Great credit is due to President İnönü who has fostered this development even though it has meant the defeat of his party. The Democrat Party victory is believed to reflect countrywide dissatisfaction with, economic conditions, and reaction against the single-party mentality characterizing many of the leaders of the People's Party... The Democrat Party, however, while admitting the necessity for state enterprise in Turkey, appears to attach more importance to the role of private enterprise and foreign capital in the development of the country than the Peoples' Party and also advocates the right of labor to strike which is now forbidden. The new government is expected to carry out its policies with moderation and caution.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V*, 1262–63.

As anticipated by James E. Webb, the Democrat Party followed a progressive governing model in comparison to the models implemented by previous governments. Democrat Party's party program especially highlighted its progressive nature. According to the program, the foundational tenets of the party were "ensuring the realization of democracy in the Republic of Turkey broadly and progressively, and the conduct of public policy with a democratic perspective and mindset."⁴⁷ Less than a month into the accession of power, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes stated that its government would take necessary measures to allow Arabic adhan, an important step in the path of religious freedoms in the country. Democrat Party's economic policies allowed more foreign investment to come into the country and supported the development of private enterprises. The most drastic economic change, however, was in the agriculture sector in which the Democrat Party followed an agriculture-based growth plan. Funds from the Marshall Plan were directed to the modernization of the sector and through a constitutional change, the Democrat Party allowed lands under the ownership of the state to be distributed to small manufacturers and landless peasants. This constitutional change and its widespread usage led to an increase of around %400 in the level of cultivated land during the 1950s.⁴⁸ Between 1950 and 1954, Turkey achieved a staggering average % of 10 growth.⁴⁹ During its four-year first term in power, the Democrat Party followed pro-Americanism as left by İnönü's government but also drastically changed the lives of many which eventually helped its electoral victory in 1954.

IV. Turkish Peace-Lovers Association and Institutionalization of Anti-Communism in Turkey

After the Democrat Party's sweeping victory in the election of 1950, the new

⁴⁷ Demokrat Parti, *Parti Programı* (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1952), 47.

⁴⁸ Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 227–29.

⁴⁹ TÜİK, *İstatistiksel Göstergeler, 1923-2008* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2009), 648.

government faced its most crucial foreign policy test almost immediately after coming into power. On June 25, 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea and started the Korean War. U.N. Security Council Resolution 83 asked member states to furnish assistance to South Korea so that it could repel North Korea's unprovoked offensive. As is explained elsewhere, the government contemplated how to answer this unexpected request from the Security Council. Eventually, the government unanimously decided to answer positively and Turkey became the second country after the U.S. to declare that it would furnish the U.N. with land forces. After consultations with the U.S., it was decided that Turkey would at first send 6092 ground troops to Korea.⁵⁰ Democrat Party announced its decision to the public on July 25, 1950. While the leading figures in the government were in agreement with the need to send ground troops to Korea, nowhere in the decision process did they consider a possible backlash. The unexpected backlash came from the far left-leaning Turkish Peace-lovers Association (*Türk Barışseverler Cemiyeti*).

Turkish Peace-lovers Association was founded by Behice Boran, a well-known academic with communist/ socialist tendencies.⁵¹ Born to a middle-class family, Boran received her higher education in the U.S. at Michigan University. There, she was introduced to communist/socialist ideology and became a fervent supporter until she died. Boran was suspended from her position at Ankara University in 1948 due to allegations that she was spreading communist ideology.⁵² According to leading communists Aclan Sayılğan and Nihat Sargın, the Turkish Peace-lovers Association was founded as a regional representative of Stockholm Appeal, a Soviet-backed initiative that aimed at promoting nuclear disarmament and

⁵⁰ "Kore Harbi'ne Türk Kuvvetlerinin Katılmasının Hatırasına Kore'de Dikilecek Abide İçin Hazırlanan Anket... [Survey Prepared for the Monument to Be Erected in Korea in Memory of the Participation of Turkish Forces in the Korean War..]," August 17, 1973, 110-9-1-15 / KORE HARBİ (1950-1953), Ministry of National Defense ATASE Archive.

⁵¹ See: Gökhan Atılğan, *Behice Boran: Öğretim Üyesi, Siyasetçi, Kuramcı* (Ankara: Yordam Kitap, 2019).

⁵² Atılğan, 104–6.

prevention of an atomic war.⁵³ Turkish Peace-lovers Association was founded on May 12, 1950, under the direction of Stockholm Appeal which urged for regional organizations. However, the Association's activities started only after Turkey announced its decision to support U.N.-backed South Korea.

Bariş (Peace) magazine, which acted as the Turkish Peace-lovers Association's press organ, published a special issue on August 1, 1950, entitled "Where is Korea?" It depicted the Korean War as a foreign event that had nothing to do with Turkey. In a special article entitled "Inside-Story of the Korean War," the magazine gave away the Peace-lovers Association's view regarding the Korean War. According to the article, "As soon as Syngman Rhee took power -in South Korea- he set up a regime of terror... Japanese were given the role of police and English was accepted as the official language." In addition, the article suggested that "there can be no doubt regarding who attacked first. Provoked by the U.S., the Korean War was started by Syngman Rhee's attack on North -Korea-"⁵⁴ As can be deduced from the abovementioned passages, the Turkish Peace-lovers Association was repeating North Korea and Soviet Union's unfounded claims regarding the Korean War.⁵⁵ Even though the Association claimed to be defending world peace, this criterion was never applied to the Soviet Union, which was openly threatening Turkey's peaceful existence or North Korea, which passed the 38th parallel and started the Korean War. Looking from this perspective, and taking into account the Turkish Peace-lovers Association's ties with the Stockholm Appeal, one can argue that the Turkish Peace-Lovers Association was guided under the ideological direction of the Soviet Union.

⁵³ Duman, "Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye'de Savaş Karşıtı Bir Örgütlenme: Türk Barışseverler Cemiyeti," 678.

⁵⁴ "Kore Savaşının İç Yüzü," *Bariş*, August 1, 1950, 4.

⁵⁵ Regarding North Korea and Russia's View of the Korean War see: *자유와 독립을 위한 조선 인민의 정의의 조국 해방 전쟁 [The Homeland Liberation War for the Justice of the Korean People's Freedom and Independence]* (평양: 조선로동당출판사, 1959); *History of the Just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean People* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981); Katie Stallard, *Dancing on Bones: History and Power in China, Russia and North Korea* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 35–49.



Figure 8. *Barış* Magazine's Front Page⁵⁶

Barış magazine also published the Turkish Peace-lovers Association's telegram to the Turkish National Assembly. In the telegram, the Association argued that the ruling Democrat Party's decision to send troops to Korea through the decree of the Council of Ministers violated the constitution since a declaration of war could only be made by the Turkish National Assembly. In addition, the Association urged Turkey not to "intervene in the armed revolution in Korea this way." Instead, the Association urged the Turkish government to do what India was doing: attempting to find a diplomatic solution.⁵⁷

What brought the Turkish Peace-lovers Association national fame, however, was the handout the members distributed on Galata Bridge, Istanbul. The handout read:

No matter how this decision of the Adnan Menderes Government is shown to the Turkish Nation, it means that we joined the war for the sake of American interests. The government made this decision with the force of America... There is no benefit to our

⁵⁶ *Barış*, August 1, 1950.

⁵⁷ "Türk Barışseverler Cemiyetinin B.M.M. Başkanlığına Çektiği Telgraf," *Barış*, August 1, 1950, 11.

future and security in the participation of the war in Korea. Necmeddin Sadak, who until recently served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and followed international affairs, answers those who say, "If we do not send troops to Korea now, America will not help us when we are in trouble": He said: "if America has an interest that day, it will help us, otherwise it will not."⁵⁸

As it can be inferred from the handout's content, the Turkish Peace-lovers Association tried to depict a situation in which Turkey was being forced by the U.S. to participate in the Korean War. In this way, the Association tried to garner support from the public. However, due to the Soviet Union's threats against Turkey, the Turkish public was more than ever inclined toward the U.S. cause. Still, the Turkish government perceived a sense of threat from the Turkish Peace-lovers Association's open disinformation against Turkey's participation in the Korean War. Here, it should be noted that, until the unfolding of this event, the political atmosphere in Turkey provided a space for leftist ideologies to express their viewpoint. However, after the distribution of handouts against Turkey's participation in the Korean War, the Turkish press and the government directly targeted the Peace-lovers Association to the point of criminalizing their activities. Turkish press took a negative stance while informing its readers about the Association's recent activities. In its coverage, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper suggested that the Association was "speaking from the mouth of Moscow."⁵⁹ *Vatan* newspaper, on the other hand, characterized the Association's activities as forming a "fake peace front" and argued that the Association was formed as a result of "red agents activities in the country."⁶⁰ *Zafer*, a newspaper close to the ruling Democrat Party suggested that "the Association's roots were outside" and recapped *Vatan*'s claim that "red agents" inside Turkey supported the foundation

⁵⁸ Duman, "Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye'de Savaş Karşıtı Bir Örgütlenme: Türk Barışseverler Cemiyeti," 680.

⁵⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1950.

⁶⁰ *Vatan*, July 28, 1950.

of the Turkish Peace-lovers Association.⁶¹ Other newspapers also followed suit and criticized the Association for its activities against Turkey's participation in the Korean War and accused members of the Association of being communists.

Leading figures from the government immediately responded to the Turkish Peace-lovers Association's allegations and directly attacked it through the use of mass media. Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü stated:

This is purely communist propaganda and communist press language. Their purpose is to destroy the strength of resistance of nations from within and thus, they hope to easily hold the population captive in the hands of foreign ideologies. The decision of the government in itself is a decision that will strengthen the possibilities of peace. ... The peace that the association founded by Behice Boran wants is communist. The one that redheads in Korea do by fighting and shedding blood with their sudden raid in Korea. The reason why the association shows us India as an example is simple. Because Indian Prime Minister Nehru appealed to Stalin on the Korean issue and asserted the mediation for admission of Red China to the United Nations.⁶²

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes held a press conference and not only attacked the Turkish Peace-lovers Association but also criticized the former Republican People's Party for letting these kinds of organizations grow in Turkish society:

We know that this association has an international root. We also have complete information about the nature of the peace that these people love. As we are preparing to meet the communist aggression in Korea, we do not doubt that the Turkish public understands communist incitement of the same nature within us, and their verdict will not be mistaken. When we took over the government, we announced an effective fight

⁶¹ *Zafer*, July 29, 1950.

⁶² *Cumhuriyet*, July 31, 1950.

against communism in the government program. We do not accept anyone or any organization's right to eliminate the freedom of others. For this reason, a party cannot be established in our country to destroy freedom. Our laws govern this. However, some people find the opportunity and hide their intentions and continue their activities in this harmful way in our country. We also observe that the main reason why the fight against them is still incomplete is that they found themselves, friends and protectors during the reign of the old government. This truth is well-known throughout the country. These circumstances will not be repeated by our government. The government and the party are fully determined on this issue. In this regard, if these people continue to take advantage of deficiencies in our laws, we will surely introduce new provisions and laws, especially during this gentle process, and prevent such acts, which are harmful to the country.⁶³

Democrat Party's reaction to the Peace-lovers Association's activities marks a significant turning point in the Turkish government's stance against communism as an ideology. As mentioned earlier, during and after World War II, the Turkish government largely left the communist movement free in its activities. That is why organizations such as the Peace-lovers Association were founded and actively propagated their ideological stance. However, the Peace-lovers Association's handout distribution can be considered the last straw in the Turkish government's neutral stance against communist activities in Turkey. Soon after Prime Minister Adnan Menderes' press conference, Peace-lovers Association's President Behice Boran, Secretary General Adnan Cemgil, a printer who printed the handouts Cemal Onur, members of the Association Vahdeddin Barut, Osman Fuat Toprakoğlu and those whose names are involved in the distribution of declarations with Reşat Güranan and other members of the

⁶³ *Ayın Tarihi*, July 1950.

society were arrested for committing acts contrary to national interests.⁶⁴ All of a sudden, the most vehement criticism against Turkey's decision to participate in the Korean War evaporated. The fate of the Peace-lovers Association became an example for other critics, and the government took some steps to limit the impact of communist ideas in Turkish society.

A red scare wave started in the immediate aftermath of the arrest of Behice Boran and other communist sympathizers. Newspapers reported more or less daily about the arrested communist sympathizers around Turkey. In addition, the ruling government also took steps to eliminate communists from its flanks. For example, on August 11, 1950, the Minister of Education promised to “eliminate all harmful and degenerate members” of the Ministry.⁶⁵ The red scare spread through most of Turkish society, and people started to tip the security forces about suspected communists. Turkey's active participation in the Korean War significantly contributed to the occurrence of this persecution on such a scale.

Democrat Party also changed the legislation regarding the foundation of various associations in Turkey. The change in Turkish Criminal Code number 141 banned any attempt “to establish the dominance of one social class over other social classes, or to eliminate a social class, or to establish societies aimed at overthrowing the established economic or social foundations within the country.” The change in Turkish Criminal Code number 142 aimed to prevent “anyone who engages in propaganda, by any means whatsoever, to destroy or weaken national sentiments.”⁶⁶ These changes, in essence, aimed at stopping communist ideological propaganda activities in Turkey. It is clear that after the purge of the Peace-lovers Association and the change in the Turkish Criminal Code, Turkey became an increasingly hard field to operate for communist ideologues. Therefore, leading leftist/communist ideology sympathizers

⁶⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1950.

⁶⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, August 11, 1950.

⁶⁶ “Türk Ceza Kanununun 141 ve 142 Nci Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun,” December 3, 1951, https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc034/kanuntbmmc034/kanuntbmmc03405844.pdf.

such as Nazım Hikmet, Sabiha, and Zekeriya Sertel found the political situation in Turkey untenable and immigrated to the Soviet Union during the 1950s. The fact that communist/leftist leading ideologues found no way but to flee the country demonstrates the extent of anti-communism in Turkey during the Korean War.

V. Associations for the Struggle with Communism and the Creation of a Common Enemy

While the Turkish government started to openly criticize and took steps to block the growth of communism, it also allowed and supported pro-American right-wing conservative groups to organize anti-communist organizations around Turkey. The Association for the Struggle with Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Cemiyeti*) was the primary proponent of the anti-communist movement in Turkey. The Association was openly pro-American and used a mixture of nationalist/religious arguments to legitimize its activities. The first Association for the Struggle with Communism was founded in İstanbul's Beşiktaş district in May 1948.⁶⁷ According to its charter, the Association for the Struggle with Communism in İstanbul was founded to fight against communism which aimed to invade the whole world and eliminate all social, religious, and cultural peculiarities of every nation. It argued that fighting against communism was a duty for all nationally conscious people. According to the charter, one of the aims of the Association was to provide financial support to those who struggle since “communism causes -ideological- destruction among those who are in financial trouble.”⁶⁸

Apart from İstanbul, Associations for the Struggle with Communism were organized mainly in Adana, Zonguldak, and İzmir. The selection of Zonguldak and Adana as hubs for Anti-Communist propaganda is quite interesting. At the time, Zonguldak was one of the major centers for coal mining, and Adana was quite an important agriculture center in the southern

⁶⁷ Ertuğrul Meşe, *Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri: Türk Sağında Antikomünizmin İnşası* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 117–19.

⁶⁸ *Komünizmle Mücadele Cemiyeti Ana Tüzüğü* (İskenderun: Özvatan Basımevi, 1948), 7.

part of Turkey. These locations were deliberately chosen since workers formed the majority of the society and communist propaganda was quite intense as well. Another interesting aspect of the formation of Associations for the Struggle with Communism was that their activities seemed to be totally in line with the Democrat Party's efforts at countering communism. It is no surprise that some Democrat Party members, nationalists, and conservatives were quite active in these Associations. For example, parliamentarians from the Democrat Party regularly participated in the so-called condemning communism meetings organized by Associations for the Struggle with Communism across Turkey.⁶⁹

Through time Associations for the Struggle with Communism garnered quite a lot of influence. These associations were mainly focusing on the common grounds between conservatism and nationalism. The charter of the second Association for the Struggle with Communism suggested that it aimed to “fight against communism through reinforcing the elements that allow us to live as a nation To achieve this goal, we will devote ourselves to our history, nation, and Allah.”⁷⁰ *Mücadele* (Struggle) magazine, the official magazine of the Association regularly used religious references such as “believers of Allah! Unite in the struggle against communism.” Communism was criticized since they did not believe in Allah, had no family values, etc. *Mücadele* often warned its readers to “be wary of communism which threatens Turkey.”⁷¹

⁶⁹ Democrat Party's Ankara parliamentarians participated in the condemning communism meeting organized by Association for the Struggle with Communism in Ulus, Ankara and the opening speech was given by parliamentarian Hamit Şevket İnce “Cumhuriyet,” August 27, 1951.

⁷⁰ Mehmet Güldal, “Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türkiyedeki Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri” (Master's Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018), 111.

⁷¹ *Mücadele*, no. 10 (n.d.).



Figure 9. *Mücadele* Magazines⁷²

Associations for the Struggle with Communism not only used religion and nationalism but also used leading politicians such as Atatürk, the founder of Turkey to garner public support. Every *Mücadele* magazine started with the alleged words of Atatürk: “It should not be forgotten that the biggest enemy of the Turkish world is communism. It should be crushed wherever it is seen.” There are differing views regarding the authenticity of the abovementioned sentence. However, there is no doubt that the members of the Associations for the Struggle with Communism truly believed it to be Atatürk’s words since they widely used it. However, Atatürk was not the only politician the Associations looked upon. Association for the Struggle with Communism’s popularity came to the level that Cemal Gürsel, the fourth President of Turkey, became the honorary president of the İzmir branch of the Association for the Struggle with Communism on June 23, 1965. Gürsel explained his reasons for becoming an honorary president in *Mücadele* magazine:

Until now, I have not taken part in any association. But I gladly accept -this invitation-.

Instead of fighting communism with laws, it is much more effective to oppose it with

⁷² *Mücadele*, Vol I, Issue 10.

the help of these associations. Because the law punishes, but these associations illuminate and enlighten the minds and consciousness of people. Therefore, this is more important.⁷³

After Gürsel's acceptance of the honorary presidency, Association for the Struggle with Communism's membership grew steadfastly. However, Gürsel did not contend with only becoming an honorary president and he provided 200,000 *lira* from Turkey's reserves so that the Associations could be able to fight sufficiently against communism.⁷⁴ Was this the only governmental support that the Associations received? Perhaps not. As is known, the U.S. was pouring a lot of money to fight against communism during the Cold War. When we closely analyze publications of Associations for the Struggle with Communism in Turkey, we can indeed find traces of American support. For example, Struggle Against Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele*) journal published in 1952 by the İstanbul Anti-Communist Association thanked the "İstanbul American news bureau for providing every convenience and help" during the publication process of the journal.⁷⁵ In addition, upon closely scrutinizing Unity for the Struggle Against Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Birliği*) journal published in Istanbul between 1952 and 1957, we come across quite a lot of U.S.-based company advertisements.⁷⁶ This documentary evidence suggests that the U.S. in one way or another was supporting Associations for the Struggle with Communism in Turkey as well.

Associations for the Struggle with Communism continued to disseminate anti-communist propaganda throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Political parties such as the Justice Party and Republican Villagers Nation Party openly supported it for their political purposes. After the announcement of the 1971 Turkish military memorandum, Associations for the

⁷³ *Mücadele* 2, no. 4 (n.d.).

⁷⁴ Güldal, "Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türkiye'deki Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri," 115.

⁷⁵ *Komünizmle Mücadele*, 1952.

⁷⁶ *Komünizmle Mücadele Birliği*, 1952.

Struggle with Communism were officially closed due to their “extreme activities.”⁷⁷ The official closing of these Associations also marked the end of an era in which the Turkish government officially supported the activities of Associations for the Struggle with Communism. Due to the negative effects of the Cyprus War on U.S.-Turkey relations, leftist elements gained quite a lot of traction while pro-Americanism became simply unpopular among many.

VI. Conclusion

This article examined two pivotal shifts in Turkish political history following World War II. The first is Turkey's pro-American reorientation in foreign policy, which intensified after the Democrat Party's 1950 election victory. This shift was characterized by progressive liberal policies, including democratization, market economy adoption, agricultural modernization, and increased religious freedoms. These changes transformed Turkey's image from an authoritarian state to a pro-American democracy, improving relations with Western nations. Turkey's participation in the Korean War further accelerated this process, cementing its new identity and facilitating its integration into the Western bloc.

The second major change stemmed from the first: the rise of anti-communism as a dominant ideological force in Turkey. When the Democrat Party decided to join the Korean War alongside the U.S., it faced resistance from the Turkish Peace-lovers Association. The government responded by criminalizing the association's activities and supporting anti-communist organizations. This led to a "purifying campaign" during the Korean War period, establishing anti-communism as a quasi-state ideology. The article framed these actions as part of a broader effort to reshape public discourse and policy priorities in line with Turkey's new pro-Western orientation.

⁷⁷ *Milliyet*, April 28, 1971.

However, the anti-communist campaign alone was insufficient to secure widespread popular support. The article notes that while this ideological shift gained traction among certain segments of society, it failed to resonate with the majority of the population. Therefore, the Democrat Party strategically used Islam as a unifying tool to broaden its popular support base. This use of religion had far-reaching consequences, effectively reviving the role of Islam in Turkey's political and public spheres, underscoring the complex interplay between foreign policy alignment, domestic political reforms, ideological shifts, and religion in shaping modern Turkey's political landscape.

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